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It is interesting to note that California has&-ekactly the same'
statute"° as North Dakota. It has one case 1 dealing with usury and
conflict of laws which does not expressly mention the statute but
in effect holds as if the statute had been applied.
Even in cases not involving usury, the courts of North Dakota
have not applied this statute3" in determining the validity of a con-
tract when there is a conflict of laws. Instead, in such cases, North
Dakota courts are inclined to apply the law of the place where the
contract was made to govern validity.33 It appears that they have
merely used the statute to interpret the terms of a valid contract.3"
It is not certain if North Dakota courts would apply the Statute
or the dictum of United States Savings and Loan Co. v. Shain35 in
cases involving usury and conflict of laws. One might conclude,
however, that the above case would be authority for usury cases
in North Dakota. As a result this state would follow the weight of
authority, applying the law of the state which would uphold the
validity of the contract when there is no express stipulation there-
in, so long as that law has some natural connection with a vital
element of the contract.
G. EUGENE ISAAK
THE COURTS AND LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT
INTRODUCrION
Disproportioned legislatures stem from two causes. One reason
is that some state constitutions call for representation in one house
based on things other than population. The other reason is that
legislators fail to act on the provisions for reapportionment as out-
lined by their respective state constitutions.
Disproportion may also be of two different kinds. One type is
the unequal population of the districts, while the other variety is
encountered by physical manipulation of the shape of the districts.
This article will primarily deal with the legislators failure to re-
30. Cal. Civil Code Ann. § 1646 (West 1954).
31. Kraemer v. Coward, 2 C.A.2d 506, 38 P.2d 458 (1934) (where place of perfor-
mance was either
' 
California, Michigan, or at such place as holder of note should select.
Payment was actually made in California; therefore, California law was used to determine
usury).
32. N.D. Rev. Code § 9-0711 (1943).
33. Douglas County State Bank v. Sutherland, 52 N.D. 617, 204 N.W. 683 (1925)
(dissent would apply place of performance); Continental Supply Co. v. Syndicate Trust Co.,
52 N.D. 209, 202 N.W. 404 (1924).
34. Kansas City Life .Ins. Co. v. Wells, 132 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1943); Cosgrave v.
McAvay, 24 N.D. 343, 139 N.W. 693 (1913) (had the place of payment not been
stipulated, the contract is -to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place
where it is made).
35. 8 N.D. 136, 77 N.W. 1006 (1898).
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apportion districts where there have been population shifts great
enough to cause malapportionment. This paper assumes that a
legislature which does not equably represent the people of a state
contains an innate weakness which limits the effective functioning
of that government on many types of problems.'
It is the thesis of this article that the courts have a duty to aid
in abolishing these "rotten borroughs. "
2
"The question is not whether the courts can do everything but
whether they can do something. Moreover, the cleavage between
growth from within and alteration imposed from without is not
absolute. Education and the practice of self improvement may
be fostered by judicious judicial intervention."
3
Legislative reapportionment and redistricting enactments are
now universally recognized as a proper subject for judicial inquiry,4
but in the past the courts have hesitated to enforce existing con-
stitutional provisions for timely reapportionment.5
It appears that the majority of the various reasons the courts have
given for denying relief can logically be divided, for the purposes
of this paper, into two groups. The first classification will deal with
the re.sons given by the court in denying relief because of innate
weaknesses in the cases brought by the plaintiffs. The second group
of reasons to be discussed involve cases which were dismissed
because of judicial extension of recognized doctrines. The question
of whether the court has jurisdiction to entertain these suits is
discussed later.
CASES HAVING INNATE WEAKNESSES
The courts have dismissed cases which they felt, in the exercise
1. In a study of reapportionment in Minnesota, the following evils attending legislative
disproportion were given:
1. Decline in legislative prestige;
2. Concentration of power in federal government;
3. Insoluble urban problems;
4. Home rule is often denied, limited, or taken back by rural dominated legislatures;
5. Elimination of unnecessary local government units has often been opposed by
rural blocs;
6. Unfair distribution of taxing power and receipts;
7. A disrespect for the law on the part of the legislators and citizens,
League of Women Voters of Minnesota, Democracy Denied, pp. 8-12 (1954). For a
more detailed analysis of legislative reapportionment, see the symposium on this problem
in 17 Law & Contemp. Prob., 253 (1952).
2. Boroughs, which at the time of .the Reform Act of 1832 contained few voters, yet
retained the privilege of sending a member to Parliament. Hence, by extension, any political
unit in a republican form of government that has more than its due proportion of repre-
sentatives in a representative body.
3. Freund, The Supreme Court And Civil Liberties, 4 Vand.-L. Rev. 533, 552 (1951).
4. See Walter, Reapportionment of State Legislative Districts, 37 Ill. L. Rev., 20, 23
(1942).
5. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). Contra, Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F.
Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956).
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of judicial discretion, were without merit. The Minnesota Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Meighen v. Weatheril6 refused to declare a -
reapportionment act, passed the year before, invalid on the grounds
of unequal population. The court said perfect exactness is neither
required nor possible. In another suit to compel the secretary of
state to redistrict in accordance with a law based on popular in-
itiative rather than one passed by the legislature six months later,
it was held that the petitioner failed to prove disproportion be-
tween representation and distribution of population.
7
Suits have also been dismissed for technical reasons. One of the
reasons relief was denied in Remmey v. Smith8 was that the suit
was premature because the legislature was still in session and had
an opportunity to enact a new reapportionment law. In Colegrove
v. Green,' Justice Rutledge, who cast the deciding vote, felt there
wasn't enough time left to effectuate the requested change in the
law before the election. Due to this lack of time he felt an electiohi
at large might be an instance where "the cure sought may be worse
than the disease." Justice Rutledge expressed essentially the same
views in MacDougall v. Green"° two years later.
Courts have denied suits where the relief asked for would have
a crippling effect on the government. Cases in this group are those
where a party seeks to have declared void statutes passed by a
legislature elected under an invalid apportionment act, 1' or to oust
by quo warranto proceedings legislators sitting in session, 12 or ,o
restrain the United States Collector of Internal Revenue from
collecting income tax in a state," or to enjoin the expenditure of
public funds to carry out an election.14
DIsMISSAL BECAUSE OF EXTENSION OF RECOGNIZED DOTRrINES
One of the principles applied to reapportionment suits is that.
the courts will not involve themselves in political matters. In Cole-
grove v. Green,15 the leading case on reapportionment, justice
Frankfurter stated the issue was of a political nature and therefore
not for judicial determination. In Remmey v. Smith,16 Perry v. Fol-
6. 125 Minn. 336, 147 N.W. 105 (1914).
7. State ex rel. O'Connell v. Myers, 319 P.2d 828 (Wash. 1957).
8. 102 F. Supp. 708 (1951).
9. 328 U.S. 549, 566 (1946).
10. 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
11. People v. Clardy, 334 Ill. 160, 165 N.E. 638 (1929).
12. People ex rel. Fergus v. Blackwell, 342 I1L, 223, 173 N.E. 750 (1930).
13. Keogh v. Neely, 50 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. .1931) cert denied, 284 U.S. 583 (1931).
14. Daly v. County of Madison, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E.2d 160 (1941).
15. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
16. 102 F Supp. 708 (1951).
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som,1" and Radford v. Gary," three subsequent well known Federal
Court cases on reapportionment, the court also felt they should
stav away from political issues.
In 1903, Justice Holmes speaking for the majority of the court,
denied a negro plaintiff all relief on the grounds that a political
question was involved. 9 It is interesting to note that twenty-four
years later in reversing the judgment of a lower court, which dis-
missed the plaintiff's petition on the ground that a political question
was involved, the same Justice Holmes stated that the objection
that the subject matter of the suit is political is little more than a
play on words.20 Chief Justice Stone stated that "Where discrimina-
tion is sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the equal
protection clause is not diminished by the fact that the discrimina-
tion relates to political rights."2' In discussing whether a question
was justiciable or not because the issue was political in nature,
Chief Justice Fuller said " . . . the judicial power of the United
States extends to all cases in law or equity arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States .... "22 The political-
question doctrine alone is an unconvincing basis for a decision to
turn on since malapportionment so plainly resembles state dis-
crimination of the kind often remedied by the federal courts.
2 3
The separation of powers doctrine has been put forth by the
courts as a reason for denying relief in reapportionment suits. 2 4 But
upon. close scrutiny this idea loses its vigor. One has only to view
the United States Government today to take notice of the liberal
construction of the doctrine of separation of powers. The creation
of administrative tribunals allows executive elements of the govern-
ment to perform judicial functions. The delegation of rule making
powers to administrative agencies permit elements of the executive
branch to perform legislative functions. The congressional investi-
gative power, so widely ordained today, smacks of a judicial nature.
The important purpose of this doctrine is the protection of the
people from the arbitrary usurpation of power. 25 It stands to reason
then that refusal of the courts to grant redress, because of violation
17. 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1956).
18. 145 F. Supp 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956).
19. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
20. -Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, .540 (1927).
21. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944).
22. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23 (1892).
23. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
24. Fergus v. Marks, 152 N.E. 557 (1926). Reapportionment: Is It Really a Political
Question? 17 La. L. Rev. 593, 596 (1957). The author has collected cases in point in
this article in footnote 19.
25. Parker v. Riley, 18 Cal.2d 83, 113 P.2d 873 (1941) (dictum).
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of the theory of separation of powers, does not preserve the in-
tegrity of the legislature but grants an insidious usurpation of
power to a minority group. This is precisely what this doctrine was
designed to prevent. Therefore if relief was granted it would not
violate the doctrine of separation of powers but uphold the basic
principles of that doctrine. Is it not logical and justifiable that the
doctrine of separation of powers should yield where its application
only serves to deprive citizens of their civil rights?
The doctrine of state sovereignty is another principle upon
which federal courts ground their refusal to give relief. Federal
District Judge Grooms in an Alabama reapportionment case,2r
used strong language to defend state sovereignty. "If the federal
courts attempt to exercise the sovereignty vested in the States, as
plaintiff here seeks, state sovereignty will suffer serious if not fatal
impairment . . . . When our fathers founded these States and
established this Union, it [state sovereignty] -was one of the corner
posts in the constitutional barriers which they erected to shield
their newly won rights from the tyranny of the all-powerful state.
No federal court should remove or mar these ancient landmarks,
'which they of old times have set in thine inheritance'."
It seems that the judge did not take notice of the Supreme Court
decisions in the school segregation cases. 27 Here the alleged
delicacy of federal-state relations as a reason for denying protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment is certainly battered down. The right
to an equal voice in the choice of representatives appears even
more important than the right to an equal education.
Some state courts have adopted the viewpoint that if the statute
was valid when enacted it is still valid no matter how extreme a
population shift took place since that reapportionment was enacted,
since the courts are precluded from coercing the legislature to
enact a new statute. 28 Thus it seems the separation of powers
doctrine will not allow an outdated reapportionment statute to
become unconstitutional..29 This idea certainly lacks logic as the
idea behind the reapportionment statutes is that the shifting
population is to be accorded its fair share of representation
periodically. It is submitted that the court, in approving the once
valid still valid theory, failed to grant sufficient weight to cases
26. Perry v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp. 874, 877 (N.D. Ala. 1956).
27. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
916 (1952).
28. Daly v. County of Madison, 378 Ill. 357, 38 N.E.2d 160 (1941).
29. Smith v. Holm, 220 Minn. 486, 19 N.W.2d 914 (1945).
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where subsequent changed conditions affected the constitutionality
of enactments in question. '
JURISDICTION PROBLEM
In most of the federal reapportionment cases the court has toyed
with the problem of jurisdiction either openly or implied. Some
said ne,31 some said yes, 2 some wouldn't say. 3 There is virtually
no question of justiciability in the state courts. Most of the plaintiffs
in the state court cases have been described as citizens, voters, and
taxpayers, that status being sufficient to challenge the apportion-
ment."
It appears jurisdiction should clearly exist for the federal courts
because of the clear violation of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 5 Further, it seems that a person is given a
definite right to bring suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C.A. §
19833" and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (3) . 7 United States v. Cruikshanks"
made it clear that while the right to vote in a state election .is
conferred by the state, the right to be protected from unlawful
discrimination comes from the United States and is a federally
protected right that is enforceable in the federal courts.
Colegrove v. Green" appears to have decided that a federal
court has jurisdiction on reapportionment questions. In the three,
one, three decision, three of the justices felt the court lacked
jurisdiction and three felt jurisdiction existed and should be exer-
cised. Justice Rutledge, in his deciding vote, felt jurisdiction was
present but that it should not be exercised in this particular case.
30 Boiling v. *Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954); Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
31 Perry v. Folsom 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1956).
32 Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958).
33. Remney v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952).
34. See, e.g., Brooks v. State ex rel. Singer, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980, 983 (1904);
.Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1067
(1958).
35. See Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Hawaii 1956).
36. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United,;States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
tho party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."
This statute is often called the Civil Rights Act.
37. "The district courts shall have original jurdisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
"(3) . . . To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ord-
inance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution of the United States or by an Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States."
38. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
39. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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Thus, four of the seven justices decided that the court had juris-
diction.
Prior to Colegrove v. Green the United States Supreme Court
took jurisdiction and reversed a Minnesota Supreme Court decision,
consequently all candidates for congress in Minnesota in 1932 ran
at large.4 0 The United States Supreme Court also exercised juris-
diction and declared invalid a New York4I and Missouri42  re-
districting act that same year.
RELIEF FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN THE COURT
In conjunction with dismissal of a suit the court sometimes says
where the remedy lies. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green :
said the remedy is to secure legislatures that will apportion
properly. A member of the Minnesota Supreme Court said the
remedy lies in the political conscience of the legislature. 4 4 In Rad-
ford v. Gary45 the court cites cases saying the remedy lies in the
hands of the people through the ballot. It appears to be poor logic
for the court to say the voter has a chance for redress at the polls
when the people who are being short-changed on their right to
equal representation have only their partial or diluted vote to use
to effect this change.
The citizen may attempt to enact appropriate legislation by the
iniative process or effect the calling of a constitutional convention.
An amendment calling for a commission of state officers," or some
other constitutional device to reapportion if legislature fails to do
so would work fine, but such solutions are difficult and impractical
because public inertia must be overcome to adopt such enactments.
The initiative, when tried, has found a rather poor reception in the
courts. The Missouri Supreme Court refused to allow the use of
the initiative for reapportionment stating the Missouri Constitution
did not allow the initiative to be used for this purpose.4 7 A Massa-
chusetts Court declared the method inapplicable to the creation of
state senatorial and representative districts. '8 The Washington
40. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
41. Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932).
42. Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932).
43. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
44. Smith v. Holm, 220 Minn. 486, 19 N.W.2d 914 (1945).
45. 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956).
46. N.D. Sess.. Laws 1959, c. 438, § 3. This amendment to the North Dakota Con-
stitution will be submitted to the qualified electors at the primary election in June, 1960.
It provides for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Attorney General, Secretary of State,
and the majority and the minority leaders of the House of Representatives to make the
required apportionment within ninety days after the adjournment of the legislature at the
first session after each federal decennial census if the legislature. fails to act.
47. State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689 (1910).
48. In re Opinion of the Justices, 254 Mass. 617, 151 N.E. 680 (1926).
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Supreme Court upheld a reapportionment act passed by the
legislature after a more fair reapportionment act was approved by
the voters by popular initiative. In the four, one, four decision the
court said the Washington Constitution permitted the legislature
to so amend an initiative act. 9
In Colorado though, an initiated reapportionment act was up-
held over a similar legislative act passed subsequently.5°
HOPE FOR COURT RELIEF
It seems axiomatic that if our courts enforce United States Con-
stitutional provisions concerning the ballot against the hazard of
stuffing,5 miscounting, 2 and denial5 3 that the court should also
provide protection against dilution of the ballot, and disproportion
of representation amounts precisely to dilution.
The hope for court intervention, especially federal court inter-
vention, is becoming brighter. In a 1956 Hawaiian case, 4 Justice
McLaughlin, speaking for the federal court in a sound and logical
decision, broke away from the traditional reluctance of the federal
courts to intervene in reapportionment problems. This case has
been distinguished, however, because of the territorial-federal
relationship involved. It has been said that state-federal relation-
ship presents a different question.5 However, the most recent
federal reapportionment case,"0 which was brought in Minnesota
in 1958, seemed to indicate a change in attitude of the federal
court in dealing with reapportionment. The court in this instance
deferred its decision but retained jurisdiction of the case, giving
the new legislature a chance to reapportion before deciding the
delicate questions involved. This unusual action evidently prompted
the legislature into acting because at the next session a new
apportionment law was passed,57 the first one since 1913.58 Conse-
quently, the suit was dismissed without prejudice in the fall of
195951 because the plaintiff's prayer for relief had been satisfied.
Therefore, at this time, it seems the courts are at least indirectly,
again headed in the direction of preserving the equality and in-
tegrity of the ballot.
49 State ex rel. O'Connell v. Myers, 319 P.2d 828 (Wash. 1957).
50. Armstrong v. Mitten, 95 Colo. 425, 37 P.2d 757 (1934).
51. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
52. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
53. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
54. Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956).
55. Perry v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Ala. 1956).
56. Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958).
57. Minn. Ex. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 45.
58. 1913 Minnesota Legislative Redistricting Act, M.S.A. § 2.02 et seq. (1946).




In view of the foregoing, it seems a possible and practical
solution to effectuate reapportionment by court action would be
by the following procedure. Join the officials who run the election-
secretary of state and county auditors-and ask for a declaratory
judgment that the existing statute is invalid. Then ask for an in-
junction against these officers to prohibit further elections under
that statute and for a writ of mandamus to cause an election at
large. An election at large is naturally not desirable, but it is
reasonable to assume that the legislators would reapportion rather
than face the prospect of an election at large.
CONCLUSION
If results alone are considered, the vast majority of cases would
appear to weigh against positive court action in reapportionment
suits. However, the ruling factors considered by the courts in
reaching their decisions are not, for the main part, inconsistent
with the position urged by this article.
If by sound and logical judicial reasoning, the courts can point
out innate weaknesses in a plaintiff's case, no relief will be given
or should be given. But if relief is denied only on the basis of
following old doctrines the court is failing to exert it's authority
and influence in moulding new law where new law is necessary.
The reasons for following these stodgy doctrines are unwarranted
because, as applied to reapportionment suits, they were either bad
law ab initio, or became so by passage of time and the trend of
our government to be more cognizant of civil liberties.
The basic political right of fair representation should have the
aid of the judiciary just as well as other political rights and liberties
such as speech and press. This problem must be solved, and the
courts should be the source of the remedy. Reliance on the legis-
lature for action has not been effective nor is it legally required.
VANCE HILL
FAILURE TO PROMPTLY HOLD PRELIMINARY HEARING
AS BAR TO CONVICTION
INTRODUCTION
In the interval between the arrest and preliminary hearing, the
established safeguards against arbitrary exercise of power over the
prisoner's freedom of motion ordinarily do not become effective.
Until the preliminary bearing before a magistrate, a prisoner is
1960]
